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The paper provides a useful analysis of how shocks in oil prices affect production 
and prices at industry and aggregate economy levels. Changes in oil prices have been 
regarded in the real business cycles (RBC) literature as a major source of productivity 
shocks that can cause business cycles. The findings of this paper therefore may have 
interesting implications for RBC models. They also remind us that the particular 
transmission mechanism of the effects of oil price changes matters a lot and that different 
economies may respond to these shocks in different ways. 
  The methodology of the paper consists of using an identified VAR model with 
three sets of variables. They are 
X1t = global oil market variables 
                  = (world crude oil output, world industrial output, spot crude oil price), 
X2t = domestic aggregate variable  
                  = (aggregate industrial production), and 
X3t = domestic industry-level variables  
                  = (industry production, producer price). 
The block recursive matrix in the estimated model ensures that the X1t variables 
depend on their lags, the X2t variables depend on their own lags and those of X1t, and the 
X3t variables depend on its own lags and those of X1t and X2t . By adopting this approach, 
the paper can analyze how the shocks in the X1t variables are transmitted to the X2t and 
X3t variables.  2 
 
While this approach is reasonable, one can nevertheless raise a number of issues. 
First, as stated above, the actual data used for the X1t variables are world crude oil output, 
industrial output of major economies, and spot crude prices. However, the paper 
interprets the shocks to these variables as oil supply shocks, global demand shocks and 
oil-specific demand shocks, respectively. This interpretation is questionable. Here we 
only have a quantity variable, a demand shifter, and a price variable. They are not 
sufficient for identifying the supply and demand functions separately. Thus, interpreting 
changes in these variables as supply and demand shocks in the oil market could be 
misleading.    
Second, the block-recursive nature of the VAR model implies that the “global” 
variables in X1t do not depend on the “domestic” variable X2t or X3t. But the US and 
Japan are the two largest economies in the world. World industrial output must therefore 
be affected by the industrial outputs in the US or Japan in some significant ways. In the 
newly added appendix, the authors states that they have partially relaxed the block 
recursive restrictions by incorporating the feedbacks from the US and Japan to the global 
oil market. They claim that the main results remain robust. This is a good attempt, but 
some readers may want to know some measures of the quantitative differences.    
Third, the paper interprets a shock as a demand shock when it causes price and 
quantity to move in the same direction and as a supply shock when it causes price and 
quantity to move in opposite directions. Changes in price and quantity could be the 
results of simultaneous movements in supply and demand. All we can say in this context 
is that supply shock dominates demand shock, or vice versa.  
Fourth, the paper claims that there is no clear evidence indicating sizable resource 
reallocation across industries both in the US and Japan. However, it also reports that the 
magnitudes of the responses of production to each kind of shocks differ considerably 
across industries. Why can’t this phenomenon be interpreted as resource reallocation 
across industries?  
The paper has several interesting results. First, oil-specific “demand” shocks are 
shown to have different implications for the US and Japan. This seems to be true 
irrespective of whether the oil price shocks are demand or supply shocks. Second, 
unanticipated oil price increases have negative impact on the US economy both at the 
aggregate and industry levels. Third, the impact of an increase in oil price on Japan’s 
aggregate economy could be positive or insignificant. However, the impact on oil-
intensive industries there is positive.   
The second result is easily anticipated. The third one is surprising, but is in fact 
reasonable. Japan is good at producing energy-efficient products. An increase in oil price 3 
 
may benefit Japan because this may induce even more people to purchase energy-
efficient Japanese products such as cars or intermediate products used for producing them. 
This result may inspire government policy making, especially at times of economic crisis 
Another point we should note is that outputs in US and Japan during the sample 
period seem to be driven by world demand and domestic aggregate demand. This may 
mean that productivity changes or other supply-side factors are unimportant. It would be 
premature for us to arrive at this conclusion, because the model itself cannot distinguish 
supply shocks from demand shocks.  